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In spite of some superficial success in achieving its overall global target, there has been 
much disillusionment with the progress on climate change since the Kyoto Protocol was 
negotiated in 1997. The key problems in addressing GHG emissions under the Kyoto 
Protocol have been the incomplete coverage across countries and lack of credibility. While 
significantly more onerous reduction commitments should be expected and required of 
developed countries in the name of economic fairness, GHG emissions must also be capped 
effectively in developing countries.   
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1. Introduction: Mounting Challenge! Shirking 
Commitments? 
educing global greenhouse gas emissions has become one of the most serious 
challenges ever to face the international community. In spite of a small number 
of dissenting views, which frequently attract media attention, there is a robust 
scientific consensus that climate change represents an extraordinarily serious 
environmental threat and that human economic activity is significantly compounding 
the problem. In the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and, subsequently, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the so-called Annex B 
countries aimed first to stabilize and then to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
relative to a base year of 1990. Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol is comprised of a 
group of 25 developed countries and a group of 13 transition countries from Central 
Europe and the former Soviet Union.
1 The collective target of the Annex B countries 
was a reduction in emissions of 5.1 percent by 2008-2012. In 2007, on the eve of the 
target period, the GHG emissions of the Annex B countries inclusive of the effects of 
changes in land use and forestry practices were 6.0 percent below their 1990 level, 
and even excluding the effects of changes in land use and forestry practices, emissions 
were 4.8 percent below the 1990 level.
2 With the aid of the recent recession to 
suppress economic growth and emissions, therefore, the prospects for meeting the 
overall target of the Kyoto Protocol are reasonably good. 
In spite of the superficial success, there has been much disillusionment with the 
progress on climate change since the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997. The 
reasons are clear to see. The United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Canada 
ratified the agreement and then largely ignored it, while Australia first refused to ratify 
the agreement and then, belatedly, with a change in government, changed its mind. In 
terms of performance, while Western European countries are on track, Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, the United States and Japan are significantly over their targets. 
If the overall target is met, it will be predominantly because of the decline in 
emissions in Russia and other transition countries, associated with their economic 
collapse in the 1990s.
3 With recovery in the transition countries over the period since 
1998, there is a strong sense that the overall Kyoto emissions reductions are not 
sustainable in the long term. The controversy has widened, with the United States and 
China as the key protagonists in a debate as to whether and to what extent the major 
developing countries should also face binding emission targets. At the recent 
Copenhagen Conference, amid suspicion, finger pointing, recrimination and public 
protest, countries meekly agreed that “the Conference of the Parties [t]akes note of the  
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Copenhagen Accord …” (United Nations, 2009). Given the scientific imperative for 
collective action on climate Change, it is important to explore how and why the 
situation has become so bogged down. 
2. Assessing and Moving Beyond the Kyoto Legacy 
he important greenhouse gasses (GHGs) associated with human activity that 
contribute to climate change include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydroflurocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride and perfluorocarbons. The latter four GHGs 
have a much greater warming potential than carbon dioxide (CO
2), but their 
concentrations in the atmosphere are lower and, aside from methane, their emissions 
tend to be roughly proportional to CO
2 (Pancoast, 2003). While data on overall GHG 
emissions is generally available for developed countries and countries with economies 
in transition, it will frequently be necessary to resort to data on CO
2 emissions so as to 
include developing countries in the discussion. 
Forestry and land use practices more generally affect the natural carbon cycle and, 
thus the extent of GHG release into the atmosphere and methane emissions from 
agriculture are an important secondary source of GHG emissions. Most GHG 
emissions that result from human economic activity, however, are attributable to the 
consumption of fossil fuels. The GHGs generated by combustion are in approximately 
fixed proportion to fossil fuel consumption in accordance with underlying scientific 
principles. Further, while abatement technologies such as carbon-capture and storage 
are on the horizon, to date emission reductions related to fossil-fuel use have been 
almost entirely through fuel saving rather than abatement. This implies that there is a 
relatively simple economic litmus test for determining how GHG emissions are 
affected by changes in economic policy and economic circumstances more generally. 
To a first approximation, changes in global emissions are proportional to the changes 
in world fossil fuel consumption. 
The overall news is not good. During the Kyoto period from 1998 to 2007, world 
fossil-fuel consumption increased by 28%. Developed Countries increased fossil-fuel 
consumption by 15.8%, Transition Countries increased consumption by 11.5 %, and 
Developing Countries increased consumption by 60.4%.
4
 The lack of success in 
curbing global fossil-fuel consumption suggests the need for a closer examination. 
Consequently, the legacy of the Kyoto Protocol is assessed across several important 
dimensions starting with international fairness as a precursor to considering a more 
effective international regime for reducing fossil-fuel use and GHG emissions. 
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2.1 How  Equitable?   
A key fairness feature of the Kyoto Protocol was its incomplete coverage. Only the 
Developed Countries and Transition Countries of Annex B made commitments to 
reduce their GHG emissions. The remaining mainly Developing Countries outside of 
Annex B were not required to make any emission reductions and, de facto, were free 
to increase their emissions. In 1998 as countries began ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, 
the Annex-B Countries accounted for 59.3% of world CO
2 emissions, which was 
down from 65.9% in 1990.
5
 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is another 
prominent feature of the Kyoto Protocol, which advances international equity. The 
CDM aims at promoting economic development in the non-Annex-B countries while 
restraining emissions. Firms or other economic players from the Annex-B countries 
can participate in projects with their counterparts in host Developing countries to 
reduce emissions below business-as-usual baselines. Since the firms from Developed 
Countries receive emission credits in return for their investment in such projects, in 
effect they purchase emissions credits.  Meanwhile, there is a transfer of income and 
net benefit to the Developing Country. 
There are at least three compelling reasons that suggest that Developed Countries 
should be expected to shoulder the largest burden in global efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions. First, the Developed Countries industrialized earlier and, thus, have been 
contributing to the problem of excessive greenhouse gasses for a much longer period. 
Second, the per capita emissions of Developed Countries tend to be much higher than 
those of Developing Countries. In 1998 the Developed Countries in Annex B emitted 
13.1 metric tons of CO
2 per person, the Economies in Transition as a group emitted 
11.9 tons per person and the non-Annex-B Developing Countries as a group emitted 
only 2.0 tons per person.
6
 Third, the Developed Countries are considerably richer.  
Consequently, they should bear and are more able to bear a larger share of the costs of 
reducing GHG emissions. In 1998 the Developed Countries had a per-capita GDP of 
$30.2 thousand (in 2005 international dollars using purchasing power parity exchange 
rates), the Transition Countries had a per-capita GDP of $7.8 thousand and the 
Developing Countries had a per-capita GDP of $3.3 thousand.
7 
There, thus, appears to be a strong international equity or fairness rationale for the 
incomplete coverage of the Kyoto Protocol itself and for its Clean Development 
Mechanism. While these provisions may have been politically expedient means of 
achieving equity, there were other possibilities. If countries had come to a politically 
more difficult agreement to tax fossil fuel use, for example, there could have been 
revenue-sharing arrangements involving net transfers to Developing Countries. 
Similarly, under a global “cap and trade” system, net purchases of emission permits by   James Gaisford 
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Developed Countries could have generated a substantive revenue flow into 
Developing Countries. Further, while the overall structure of the Kyoto Protocol may 
have been broadly equitable, there are also some awkward anomalies. For example, in 
1998 Australia’s per capita GDP of $27.0 thousand was close to the Developed 
Country average of $30.2 thousand and its per-capita emissions of 18.2 metric tones 
of CO
2  per person vastly exceeded the Developed Country average of 13.1 tons per 
person. Nevertheless, far from a commitment to reduce its emissions, Australia simply 
committed to restrict its increase in emissions to 8%. (See Figures 1, 2, 6 and 8 in the 
Technical Appendix.) In any case, equity is just one of the important yardsticks for 
assessing the Kyoto Protocol. 
2.2 How Effective? 
Basic arithmetic has significantly undermined the effectiveness of Kyoto Protocol due 
to its incomplete coverage. The collective commitment of the Annex-B Countries was 
to reduce GHG emissions 5.1% below 1990 levels. The GHG emissions of these 
countries as a group had already fallen by 7.6% over the interval from 1990 to 1995 
owing primarily to the steep recession in the transition countries.
8
 Consequently, if all 
Kyoto-commitments were exactly met, the GHG emissions of the Annex-B Countries 
as a group over the 2008-2012 period would actually be 2.5% higher than their 1995 
level. To expand the discussion to include Developing Countries, it is helpful to focus 
on CO
2 emissions data, which is more widely available. The CO
2 emissions of the 
Annex-B countries had already fallen by 3.9% over the interval from 1990 to 1998, 
and so that only a further 1.3% reduction below the 1998 level would have been 
required to meet the Kyoto target. Given that the Annex-B countries produced only 
59.3% of world carbon dioxide emissions in 1998, world CO
2 emissions over the 
2008-2012 period would have been a mere 0.8% below the 1998 level in the best-case 
scenario where the CO




Over the period from 1998 to 2006, however, CO
2 emissions in the unconstrained 
Developing Countries increased by a massive 53.9%. Meanwhile, CO
2 emissions also 
rose by 6.9% in the supposedly constrained Annex-B Countries and, thus world 
emissions were 26.1% higher. On an overall basis, Developing Countries accounted 
for 85% of the increase in CO
2 emissions between 1998 and 2006. Looked at another 
way, if the Annex-B Countries had reduced CO
2 emissions by 1.3% instead of 
increasing them by 6.9% between 1998 and 2006, world CO
2 emissions would “only” 
have risen by 21.1% rather than 26.1%.
10
   
   James Gaisford 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy         232 
 
Excluding Developing countries, which accounted for 40.7% of world emissions 
in 1998, was a problematic feature of the Kyoto Protocol from the start.  Given the 
rapid growth in emissions by the Developing Countries, this became a fatal flaw. With 
a 49.7% and rising share of world CO2 emissions attributable to Developing Countries 
by 2006 (see Figure 5 in the Technical Annex), any arguments that might have been 
made in favour of the incomplete coverage of the Kyoto Protocol should now have 
been totally discredited. While the political process has been painful to watch, this 
lesson may have been partially learned by the end of the Copenhagen Conference. The 
Copenhagen Accord does call for “Nationally appropriate mitigating actions” by 
Developing Countries, but the parameters are much looser than for the “Quantified 
economy-wide emission targets for 2020” that are expected of the Annex-B Countries 
(United Nations, 2009, Appendix I and II respectively). 
2.3 How Much GHG Leakage? 
Basic economics has exacerbated the problem of incomplete coverage, which was 
built into the Kyoto Protocol. The 53.9% increase in CO
2 emissions by Developing 
Countries discussed above was clearly far from the best-case scenario of constant 
emissions, which advocates and some of the famers of the Kyoto Protocol might have 
imagined. Indeed, more careful consideration of this best-case emissions scenario 
suggests that it unrealistically presupposes no economic growth and no trade linkages 
between countries. 
The main reason for the dramatic increase in emissions by Developing Countries 
is clearly economic growth. For the Developing Countries as a group, GDP was 
48.8% higher in 2006 than in 1998. Consequently, there was only a small increase in 
their average CO
2 emissions intensity from 1.38 to 1.42 kilograms of carbon dioxide 
per constant US dollar of GDP between 1998 and 2006 and the emissions intensity 
actually fell slightly between 1990 and 2006. While China’s emissions almost doubled 
between 1998 and 2006, its emissions intensity actually declined slightly from 2.95 to 
2.85 kilograms of carbon dioxide per constant US dollar of GDP.
11
 Overall, the 
impressive economic growth in many Developing Countries is very closely linked 
with the world’s dramatic lack of progress in curbing the growth of CO
2 emissions 
under the Kyoto Protocol. While the evidence is now incontrovertible that there 
cannot be significant progress on reducing GHG emissions without commitments 
from major Developing Countries, this evidence also points to a concern that 
significant emissions reductions may come at the cost of slower economic growth at 
least in the short to medium term while the world economy adjusts to lower GHG 
emissions and higher effective prices for energy use. This apparent dilemma continues   James Gaisford 
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to significantly affect the stance of Developing Countries in current negotiations and 
very rightly so. 
With the rapid economic growth in Developing Countries, it might be tempting to 
think that world GHG emissions would have even worse but for the presence of the 
restraints on the Annex-B Countries. Sadly, this too is a dubious proposition. Under a 
state of autarky or no trade, emission reductions by the Annex-B Countries would 
have no repercussions on the emissions of the unconstrained Developing Countries. In 
a trading world, however, as production of the most emissions-intensive goods and 
services is reduced in the Annex-B Countries, these activities will tend to be displaced 
to Developing Countries, which do not face emissions constraints. This production 
displacement is associated with an increase in GHG emissions in unconstrained 
countries. 
It has generally been assumed that such GHG “leakage” or “crowding out” will 
result in increases in emissions in unconstrained countries being of smaller magnitude 
than the initial reductions by constraining countries. Nevertheless, it is easy to 
envisage situations where there is a larger, not smaller, increase in GHG emissions by 
Developing Countries than the initial reduction by Annex-B Countries. In the worst-
case scenario for the world environment, the decrease in production of emission-
intensive goods and services by the Annex-B Countries would be matched by a one-
for-one increase in the production of those goods and services in Developing 
Countries. Interestingly, full production displacement of this type occurs in some of 
the simplest possible international-trade models addressing GHG emissions.
12
 If, for 
each good and service, Developed and Developing countries used similar production 
techniques and had similar emission intensities, then with full production 
displacement the increase in emissions by Developing Countries would, to a first 
approximation, nullify the reduction by Developed Countries. 
The empirical evidence shown in Figure 14 in the Technical Annex, however, 
suggests a statistically significant inverse relation of large magnitude between a 
country’s level of economic development measured by per capita income and CO2 
emission intensities of its production techniques. For each thousand-dollar increment 
in real GDP, CO2 emissions intensity would fall by 6.4% for a country that was 
comprised of the world average shares of services, manufacturing, other industry and 
agriculture. This implies that, in terms of GHG emissions, there are not only “cleaner” 
and “dirtier” goods and services in terms of GHG emissions, but that Developed 
Countries are “cleaner” than Developing Countries in the production of similar goods 
and services. One possible reason is that the fuel-saving activity, which underlies 
lower emissions, tends to be highly capital intensive and capital tends to more   James Gaisford 
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abundant and, thus, cheaper in high-income Developed Countries. In any case, in a 
worst-case scenario with full production displacement of emission-intensive activity 
from “cleaner” Developed Countries to “dirtier” Developing Countries, there would 
be a “GHG reversal” where a net increase in world GHG emissions arises from a 
Kyoto-type agreement. 
Even more paradoxically, consider the fact that the US declined to ratify its 
participation and countries such as Canada chose to ignore their commitments. In the 
worst case scenario of full production displacement, such opting out would reduce the 
extent of displacement of emissions-intensive activity to Developing Countries 
leading to a smaller GHG reversal and, thereby a smaller increase in world GHG 
emissions. This implies that the flaws in the structure of the Kyoto Protocol are 
sufficiently serious that the impact on the global environment might have been worse 
with a wholehearted commitment by more of the Annex-B countries. 
2.4 How Efficient? 
Whether the production displacement that would have arisen if the Annex-B Countries 
met their Kyoto commitments would merely have caused partial GHG leakage or 
would have caused a more serious GHG reversal remains an open empirical question. 
In either case, however, the analysis exposes an important structural flaw in the Kyoto 
framework; it displaces production of the “dirtiest” or most GHG intensive goods and 
services to the “dirtiest” or most GHG intensive countries. Rather than restricting 
emissions in the most developed countries that accounted for 60% of world emissions 
at the time, it actually would have been better for the world environment to restrict the 
GHG emissions of the least developed countries that accounted for 60% of world 
emissions. Production would be then have been displaced to less emission-intensive 
Developed Countries resulting in an overall reduction in emissions even if there was 
full trade displacement of emissions-intensive activities from Developing to 
Developed Countries. Of course, restricting the emissions of all countries would still 
have represented an improvement over either “60% solution.” 
For efficiency, reductions in GHG emissions should be achieved at the lowest 
possible cost. This is particularly important given that the ultimate goal is very 
substantive reductions in GHG emissions. Although the incomplete coverage of Kyoto 
Protocol is highly problematic from an efficiency perspective, it was intended that the 
Clean Development Mechanism would at least partially address this deficiency. As 
discussed previously, firms from Developed Countries can receive emission credits in 
return for their investment in emission-reduction projects in Developing Countries 
under the CDM in the Kyoto Protocol. When emissions can be reduced at lower cost    James Gaisford 
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through a project in host Developing Countries than in their regular operations at 
home, it is in the private interest of firms to pursue this option.  Thus, the CDM opens 
the door to greater efficiency in goods markets by allowing greater output to be 
produced with the same level of overall emissions. In a similar vein to the CDM, the 
Kyoto Protocol also allows projects where the host country is form Annex B under the 
heading of Joint Implementation and direct Emissions Trading between pairs of 
countries in Annex B (United Nations, 1998). 
Superimposing the CDM on the proposed reductions in emissions by the Annex-B 
Countries, however, may have a detrimental impact on world GHG emissions. At the 
initial prices, emission-intensive activities would increase in both Developed and 
Developing Countries alike. Firms and other economic players in Developed 
Countries benefit from the cost-saving opportunities while indirect subsidies 
attributable to CDM projects accrue to their counterparts in Developing Countries. Of 
course, the increase emissions in Developed Countries stemming from CDM credits is 
exactly offset by the emission reductions in Developing Countries resulting from the 
associated CDM projects. In Developing Countries, where the increase in emission-
intensive activity is not subject to an overall emission cap, the impact of the CDM 
depends both on the change in output for emission-intensive activities and on the 
change in emissions per unit of output. The effect on global GHG emissions from the 
drop in emissions per unit output in Developing Countries, as we have just discussed, 
is exactly offset by the increase in emissions in Developed Countries. Consequently, 
the increase in emission intensive outputs stimulated by the indirect subsidy would 
lead to greater world emissions at the initial prices. Subsequent market equilibration in 
the face of likely excess supply, however, will typically lead to lower prices for 
emission-intensive goods and services. This, in turn, will at least moderate and may 
reverse the increase in emission-intensive output in Developing Countries and, thus, 
world emissions. Nevertheless, with emissions in Developing Countries 
unconstrained, world emissions could either rise or fall due the inclusion of the CDM 
in the Kyoto Protocol. 
The problem, once again is the lack of constraints on emissions by Developing 
Countries. If such constraints were present, the CDM would lead to greater efficiency 
by providing an avenue for emissions trading while leaving world emissions 
unchanged. Indeed, with all countries constrained, a streamlined emission-trading 
regime between Developed and Developing Countries is vital to achieving any overall 
reduction in world emissions at the lowest possible economic cost.   James Gaisford 
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2.5 How Credible? 
There have been obvious compliance problems with the Kyoto Protocol. Excess 
Greenhouse Gasses in the atmosphere represent a negative global public good, which 
is harmful to all countries. Consequently, there is an incentive for each country to 
“free ride” on the reductions in GHG emissions by all other countries and thereby 
receive benefits without bearing costs. Consequently, in the absence of serious 
consequences for non-compliance, it is hardly surprising that compliance has been a 
problem. 
Figures 1 and 2 in the Technical Annex to this paper suggest that, in 2007, the 
only countries on track to meet their Kyoto commitments were Western European and 
Transition countries, with the latter “succeeding” only because of steep recessions 
through the 1990s. Australia initially declined to ratify the Kyoto Protocol but 
recently, with a change in government, did ratify it. Canada by contrast initially 
ratified the Protocol but with its change in government acknowledged that it would 
not meet its target. Between 1990 and 2007, Australia’s GHG emissions increased by 
30.0% and Canada’s emissions increased by 26.2% according to Figure 2 in the 
Technical Annex. In 2007, this left Australia 22.0% above its Kyoto target of an 8% 
increase in emissions and Canada 32.2% above its considerably more ambitious target 
of a 6% reduction in emissions. Although the US participated in the Kyoto 
negotiations and made a provisional commitment to reduce its emissions by 7%, with 
difficulties in Congress and a change in presidents and priorities, it eventually decided 
against ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. In spite of this, it is interesting to note that the 
16.8% increase in US GHG emissions compares favourably to countries such as 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. It is noteworthy that Japan has also failed to 
reduce its emissions. Japan, which has a very low emission intensity of 0.245 
kilograms of CO2 per constant US dollar of GDP, experienced an 8.2% increase in 
GHG emissions from 1990 to 2007 whereas it had targeted a 6% reduction.
13 
It would be difficult to escape the conclusion that there were few if any 
consequences for to countries that engaged in political posturing rather than action in 
relation to their Kyoto commitments or chose to ignore or back out of their 
commitments entirely. This poses significant credibility issues for the Copenhagen 
Accord and any future agreements. In the wake of the credibility issue exposed by the 
Kyoto Protocol, there is a growing sense that there need to be trade-consequences for 
countries that do not make or follow through with commitments. To forestall a likely 
drift toward a free-for-all of retaliation for non-compliance and counter-retaliation, 
there is a strong case to be made for World Trade Organization (WTO) oversight of 
trade penalties.   James Gaisford 
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Since failure to implicitly or explicitly “price” emissions per se or the underlying 
external effect of fossil fuel use could be seen as an “unfair” subsidy, one avenue 
would be to adapt the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
to codify allowable trade penalties. Even this would represent no small change. Under 
the current agreement, actionable subsidies and countervailing measures are, for the 
most, part industry specific whereas the implicit subsidies on fossil-fuel use or 
emissions would be generally available. While all goods and services from non-
compliant or non participating countries would be subject to countervailing measures, 
the rates of duty across sectors would vary depending on the emissions or fossil fuel 
intensities as determined by input-output tables. Of course, this is not to trivialize the 
substantive difficulties in agreeing upon and then calculating the degree to which 
fossil fuel or emissions are under priced. Nevertheless, it appears to be a given that if 
countries agree to significant GHG reductions under the Copenhagen Accord, then 
trade penalties will be imposed on those that do not follow through by those that do. 
The only real question appears to be whether or not there will be international 
disciplines on such trade penalties.  
3. Conclusion: Changing Directions 
While this assessment clearly suggests the need for a fundamental change in direction 
with respect to global coordination on climate change policy, there is a concomitant 
need to re-evaluate policy within many Developed Countries as well as Developing 
Countries. 
3.1 Rethinking National Action 
In public discourse on responses to the challenge of climate change, particularly 
in North America, the development of new technologies has become a key mantra. 
While the role of technological change is undoubtedly important, this does not mean 
that governments should be promoting this or that specific new technology. For 
example it is generally a dubious proposition to subsidize hybrid vehicles, wind 
power, carbon capture and storage, etc. Governments have been notoriously bad at 
picking winners to promote via subsidies or other means. Rather, the primary job of 
government is to set policy such that the price that users of fossil fuel face reflects the 
full social cost and to provide general incentives for research and development by 
protecting intellectual property. Getting the price signals right is particularly important 
over the long-term to provide the incentive for the development of new technologies 
that will result in fuel saving and abatement. 
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While policy to reduce GHG emissions must be multifaceted and include 
initiatives related to land use, particularly in forestry and agriculture, it is most 
important to implement measures aimed at reducing emissions from fossil fuel use. 
Either GHG emissions per se or the underlying fossil fuel consumption could be 
reduced by means of direct controls or indirectly through taxes. If direct controls are 
used, in the interest of economic efficiency it is crucial that permits for GHG 
emissions or fossil fuel use are tradable so that any aggregate reduction in emissions is 
achieved at minimum cost. Countries must deliberately implement either 
environmental taxation or cap-and-trade policies if they are to move beyond gesturing 
toward action on climate change. 
Regions that are net fossil-fuel consumers — whether they are individual 
countries, groups of countries or sub-national jurisdictions such as Canadian provinces 
— often tend to see fossil-fuel producing areas as the primary problem. Nevertheless, 
reductions in the use or consumption of fossil fuel are actually central to reducing 
GHG emissions. Since consumption is the culprit, it is consumption that should be the 
focus of policy so that the price rises and users pay the full social cost. In a closed 
competitive economy, basic economics does indicate that taxing the production of 
fossil fuel would be equivalent to taxing consumption. For a competitive trading 
economy, however, imports as well as production would have to be taxed and exports 
would have to be subsidized, all to the same extent, so as to boost the domestic price 
to reflect the marginal social cost in the same way as a consumption tax. Given the 
difficulties associated with trade commitments, it appears clear that the policy focus 
should remain on fossil fuel consumption. 
3.2 Rethinking Global Coordination 
While economic growth and international trade undermined the Kyoto Protocol, 
growth and trade are certainly not the issues. Rather, the key problems in addressing 
GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol have been the incomplete coverage across 
countries and lack of credibility. Real progress on mitigating the impact of climate 
change in the post-Copenhagen world is not possible without a fundamental change of 
direction in these areas. While significantly more onerous reduction commitments 
should be expected and required of Developed Countries in the name of economic 
fairness, GHG emissions must also be capped effectively in Developing Countries. 
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1.  The 25 Developed Countries in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations, 
1998) include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Liechtenstein, 
Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The 13 Transition 
Countries are: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Ukraine. Except for the exclusion of Turkey and Belarus, Annex B of the Kyoto 
Protocol contains the same countries as Annex I of the UNFCCC (United Nations, 
1992).   
2.  The data source for calculations the overall reduction commitment and overall 
emissions is the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change) “GHG data from UNFCCC.”   
3.  See Figures 1 and 2 in the Technical Annex to this paper for further data on Kyoto 
commitments and emissions results for Annex-B Countries. 
4.  The data source for calculations of increased fossil fuel use is the United States, 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) Database. See Figures 3 and 4 in the 
Technical Annex for further data on trends in fossil fuel use across a variety of 
important countries. 
5.  The data source for calculations of shares of world CO2 emissions is the United 
States, Energy Information Administration (EIA) Database. See Figure 5 in the 
Technical Annex for additional information. 
6. Calculations are based on CO2 emissions data from the United States, Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) Database and population data from the World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) database. See Figures 6 and 7 in the 
Technical Annex for further data on trends in CO2 emissions per capita across a 
variety of important countries. 
7. The data source for calculations of per-capita GDP is the World Bank, World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database. See Figures 8 and 9 in the Technical 
Annex for further data on trends in per capita GDP across a variety of important 
countries. 
8.  The data source for GHG emissions is the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change) “GHG data from UNFCCC.”   
9.  The data source for the calculations of CO2 emissions is the United States, Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) Database. See Figure 10 in the Technical Annex   James Gaisford 
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for further data on Kyoto commitments and emissions results for Annex-B 
Countries. 
10. The data source for the calculations of CO2 emissions is the United States, Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) Database. See Figure 11 in the Technical 
Annex for further data on Kyoto commitments and emissions results for 
Developing Countries. 
11. These calculations are based on CO2 emissions data from the United States, 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) Database and real GDP data from the 
World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) database. See Figures 12 and 
13 in the Technical Annex for further data on trends in CO2 emissions intensities 
across a variety of important countries. 
12. See Gaisford and Pancoast, 2005; Pancoast, 2003; and Sagidova, 2007. Copeland 
and Taylor (2005) show that “crowding in” could also occur in the context of a 
theoretical model where all countries use broadly similar production techniques 
and a group of countries that are net importers of emission-intensive goods agree 
to tighten their emissions caps. Starting from an initial policy equilibrium where 
all countries have emission caps, emission reductions by the net importing group 
causes increases in the prices of emission-intensive goods that makes the net-
exporting group of countries richer and induces them to reduce their emissions. 
Unfortunately, this model appears to be of limited relevance. The empirical 
evidence in the Technical Annex suggests that Developing Countries use 
production techniques that are systematically more emission-intensive than 
Developed Countries and that Developing Countries have no effective caps on 
their overall emissions.  
13. The data source is the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change) “GHG data from UNFCCC.” See Figure 1 as well as Figure 2 in 
the Technical Annex for further data on Kyoto commitments and emissions 
results for Annex-B Countries.  See also Figure 12 for data on CO2 emissions 
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